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Abstract
We construct a financial “Turing test” to determine whether human subjects can differenti-
ate between actual vs. randomized financial returns. The experiment consists of an online
video-game (http://arora.ccs.neu.edu) where players are challenged to distinguish ac-
tual financial market returns from random temporal permutations of those returns. We find
overwhelming statistical evidence (p-values no greater than 0.5%) that subjects can con-
sistently distinguish between the two types of time series, thereby refuting the widespread
belief that financial markets “look random”. A key feature of the experiment is that subjects
are given immediate feedback regarding the validity of their choices, allowing them to learn
and adapt. We suggest that such novel interfaces can harness human capabilities to process
and extract information from financial data in ways that computers cannot.
Keywords: Market Efficiency, Human Pattern Recognition, Machine/Human Interfaces,
Technical Analysis, Video Games.
JEL Classification: G14, G17, D81
∗The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors only, and do not necessarily
represent the views and opinions of AlphaSimplex Group, MIT, Northeastern University, or any of their
affiliates and employees. The authors makes no representations or warranty, either expressed or implied,
as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained in this article, nor are they recommending
that this article serve as the basis for any investment decision—this article is for information purposes
only. Research support from Northeastern University and MIT Lab for Financial Engineering is gratefully
acknowledged. We thank Dolphy Fernandes for programming assistance.
†Senior Research Scientist, AlphaSimplex Group, LLC, One Cambridge Center, Cambridge, MA 02142,
(617) 475–7106 (voice), jasmina@alum.mit.edu (email).
‡Harris & Harris Group Professor, MIT Sloan School of Management, and Chief Investment Strategist,
AlphaSimplex Group, LLC, MIT Sloan School of Management, 50 Memorial Drive, E52–454, Cambridge,
MA 02142, (617) 253–0920 (voice), alo@mit.edu (email).
§Assistant Professor, Northeastern University, College of Computer and Information Science. Corre-
sponding author: Emanuele Viola, Northeastern University, College of Computer and Information Science,
360 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, (617) 373–8298 (voice), viola@ccs.neu.edu (email).
1 Introduction
Market efficiency—the idea that “prices fully reflect all available information”—is one of the
most important concepts in economics. A vast literature has been devoted to its formula-
tion, statistical implementation, and refutation since Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965a,b
and 1970) first argued that price changes, or returns, must be unforecastable if they fully
incorporate the information and expectations of all market participants. The more efficient
the market, the more random the sequence of returns generated by it, and the most efficient
market of all is one in which returns are completely random and unpredictable.
Although there is compelling statistical evidence that financial security prices do not
always follow random walks (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988 and 1999), the belief that human beings
cannot distinguish market returns from randomly generated ones is widespread. For example,
Malkiel (1973) discusses an experiment in which students were asked to generate returns by
tossing fair coins, which yielded observations that were apparently indistinguishable from
market returns (p. 143). Along the same lines, Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport (1988) conduct an
experiment of a portfolio selection problem, where 40 subjects are asked to choose between
two assets whose returns are sampled randomly and independently from normal distributions,
and given the option of viewing the assets’ past return series. The authors find that “even in
the extreme case of our experiment, where the subjects were instructed and could actually
verify that the stock price changes were random, many of them still developed, maintained
for a while, discarded, and generated new hypothesis about nonexistent trends” (p. 409).
The same conclusions are reached by De Bondt (1993), who in a series of experiments about
forecasting stock prices and exchange rates, finds that “people are prone to discover ‘trends’
in past prices and to expect their continuation,” even when “stock prices changes are highly
unpredictable” (p. 357). Similar experiments are reported in Roberts (1959), Keogh and
Kasetty (2003), and Swedroe (2005), and summarized in Warneryd (2001). The belief that
humans cannot tell real market data from random data stands in sharp contrast to those
finance practitioners known as “technical analysts” who study past returns with the aim
of forecasting future returns, a task that is impossible for randomly generated returns and,
therefore, should not be possible for market returns either. Technical analysts often look for
particular geometric patterns in market returns, e.g., “head and shoulders,” while disciples
of efficient markets argue that the same patterns appear in randomly generated returns,
making such pattern-matching algorithms useless for prediction.
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Figure 1: Reindeer (real data in top panel).
Figure 2: Bear (real data in bottom panel).
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to test the ability of human
subjects to distinguish between actual and randomly generated returns of financial securities.
We develop a simple web-based video-game in which subjects are shown two dynamic price
series side by side—both of which display price graphs evolving in real time (a new price
realized each second)—but only one of which is a “replay” of actual historical price series.1
The other series is constructed from a random shuffling of the actual series, which preserves
the marginal distribution of the returns but eliminates any time-series properties, effectively
creating a random walk for prices (Figures 1 and 2). Subjects are asked to press a button
indicating their selection of the actual price series, and are informed immediately whether
they were correct or incorrect (Figures 3 and 4), after which the next pair of price series
1See http://arora.ccs.neu.edu.
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Figure 3: Wrong choice in Beaver contest.
Figure 4: Correct choice in Elk contest.
begins being displayed.
In a sample of 78 subjects participating in up to 8 different contests (using different types
of financial data),2 with each contest lasting two weeks and concluding with prizes awarded to
top performers, we obtained 8015 human-generated guesses for this real-time choice problem.
The results provide overwhelming statistical evidence (p-values of at most 0.5%) that humans
can quickly learn to distinguish actual price series from randomly generated ones.
We put forward our experiment as a kind of financial “Turing test.” As in Turing’s
original formulation (Turing, 1950)—a computer passes his test if a human subject cannot
distinguish between interactions with it and another human subject—our experiment is
meant to determine whether humans can distinguish actual financial data from randomly
2Specifically, 78 accounts were created, each corresponding to a unique e-mail address.
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generated data. Interaction is a key component of both tests; in our case it amounts to
human subjects receiving feedback about their guesses. To date, no known computer has
passed Turing’s test. Similarly, our findings indicate that as of now, financial markets have
not passed our financial Turing test.
2 Experiment Design
To test the null hypothesis H that human subjects cannot distinguish between actual and
randomly generated price series, we begin with a time series of actual historical prices
{p0, p1, p2, . . . , pT} and compute the returns or price differences {rt},
rt ≡ pt − pt−1 (1)
from which we construct a randomly generated price series {p∗0, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
T} by cumulating
randomly permuted returns:
p∗t ≡
t∑
k=1
rpi(k) , p
∗
0 ≡ p0 , pi(k) : {1, . . . , T} → {1, . . . , T} (2)
where pi(k) is a uniform permutation of the set of time indexes {1, . . . , T}. A random
permutation of the actual returns does not alter the marginal distribution of the returns,
but it does destroy the time-series structure of the original series, including any temporal
patterns contained in the data. Therefore, the randomly permuted returns will have the same
mean, standard deviation, and moments of higher order as the actual return series, but will
not contain any time-series patterns that can be used for prediction. This construction will
allow us to test specifically for the ability of human subjects to engage in visual pattern
recognition in financial data.
To implement this comparison, we developed a web-based video-game which was adver-
tised via email and on websites to computer science students at Northeastern University,
MBA students at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and finance practitioners (see Fig-
ure 5 for a sample advertisement).3 After registration, a subject can participate in trials
3The video-game can be accessed at http://arora.ccs.neu.edu. To recruit subjects, an announcement
was emailed to Northeastern computer science students, MIT Sloan MBA students in the Fall section of
15.970, members of the Market Technicians Association mailing list, the MTA Educational Foundation
mailing list, the American Association of Individual Investors mailing list, and the staff and Twitter followers
of TraderPsyches.
4
ARORA is a web game about randomness in financial data.
Four new contests, each worth $25, are now available.
Contests close on December 20th, 2009 at 12pm.
Don't miss your chance to win $100!
This is how the game works:
We collect data from various financial markets and we show it to you in two 
windows,
- one window plots the real data,
- the other plots the data randomly permuted.
The game asks you to click on the real, non-random data.
To enter a contest, and for your input to be recorded, you must create an 
account. You will remain anonymous.
ARORA is an MIT/NEU research project by Jasmina Hasanhodzic, 
Andrew W. Lo, and Emanuele Viola.
http://arora.ccs.neu.edu
Figure 5: Call for subjects for ARORA.
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from eight different contests, each consisting of the same game applied to different data sets.
The data sets consist of returns of eight commonly traded financial assets: the NASDAQ
Composite Index, the Russell 2000 Index, the US Dollar Index, Gold (spot price), the Dow
Jones Corporate Bond Price Index, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Canada/US Dol-
lar Foreign Exchange Rate, and the S&P GSCI Corn Index (spot price).4 These data sets
were arbitrarily named after animals, so that users had no knowledge of the specific financial
assets used in the experiment.
Participating in a trial consists of the following task. The subject is shown two dynamic
price charts on a computer screen, one above the other (Figures 1 and 2). Each graph evolves
through time—similar to those appearing in computer trading platforms—plotting the price
at that point in time as well as the trailing prices over a fixed time window over the most
recent past. Prices are defined as the cumulative sum of a sequence of returns. Of the two
moving charts, only one corresponds to the sequence of market returns from the actual data
set; we call this graph the “real” chart or {pt}. The other corresponds to the sequence of
returns obtained by randomly permuting the sequence of market returns; we call this graph
the “random chart” or {p∗t}. The computer chooses at random which of the two graphs is
placed at the top or the bottom.
The subject is asked to decide which of the two moving charts is the real one by clicking
on it. The game registers the subject’s choice, and informs the subject immediately whether
his/her guess is correct or incorrect (Figures 3 and 4). For each data set, the user is shown
approximately 35 pairs of moving charts and asked to make as many choices. The subject
is also free to refrain from choosing. This happened rarely, and to err on the conservative
side, we recorded the absence of a guess as an incorrect choice for that trial.5 To provide
the participants with some incentive for making correct choices, top-scoring players were
awarded prizes ($10 or $25 Amazon gift certificates).
To evaluate the robustness of our experimental design, we varied various parameters of
the experiment across data sets, as indicated in the Results section below. In addition,
we presented subjects with data charts in two different ways. For half of the data sets
corresponding to transaction-by-transaction (or “tick”) data, each subject was shown a fresh
set of charts, based on a sequence of returns disjoint from the sequences shown to other
subjects. For the other half of the data, corresponding to daily data, the charts shown to
each subject were based on the same sequence of returns.6
4The Dow Jones Corporate Bond Price Index was obtained from the Global Financial Database, while
all other data series were obtained from Bloomberg.
5For two of the data sets, we also dropped one subject from each because the two subjects provided
responses for less than 50% of the trials.
6However, the data was shifted by a random amount for security reasons, i.e., to avoid the possibility
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Finally, for each data set, subjects were offered the opportunity to practice on a separate
set of data.
3 Results
The results are summarized in Figure 6. For each data set we report how many return
observations are presented to each subject (points per chart). As the charts are moving,
we also report how many returns are present on the screen at any moment (points per
screen). We then report how many pairs of charts each subject was presented with (charts
per subject), and how many subjects participated (subjects). The distribution of correct
guesses across subjects is reported in a histogram, and the sum of correct guesses across all
subjects is below that.
Under the null hypothesis H, human subjects should not be able to distinguish between
real and random charts, so their choices should be no better than purely random guesses.
Therefore, testing the null hypothesis involves computing the probability value, or p-value,
of obtaining at least as many correct guesses when guessing at random, i.e., by tossing a fair
coin. Specifically, for a given data set where s subjects were shown c charts each, suppose
the experiment resulted in a total of g correct guesses. The p-value is computed as the
probability that the number X of “heads” in n ≡ s · c independent tosses of a fair coin is at
least g:
p-value ≡ Pr[X ≥ g] =
n∑
i=g
(
n
i
)
/2n . (3)
For example, the data set “Lynx” consists of s = 26 subjects that were shown c = 35 charts
and made g = 506 correct choices, implying a p-value of 0.00040 or 0.040%.
The p-values for each data set are reported in Figure 6. The evidence against the null
hypothesis is overwhelming: the p-values are at most 0.503% for each of the eight data sets,
and are less than 0.001% for six of them.
that two subjects could coordinate their guesses, for example by simultaneously playing the same charts on
two nearby machines.
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Figure 6: Summary of experimental results across all eight contests.
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4 Discussion and Conclusion
A natural question that arises is how the subjects managed to perform so well. One may
wonder whether the eight data sets presented were selectively chosen from a larger universe of
results based on performance. In fact, the results presented comprise the entire experiment.
We also considered the possibility of a potentially biased pool of subjects; perhaps those
with greater familiarity with financial data were drawn to this challenge. Subjects were
asked to specify their profession, and the percentage of correct guesses for those 23 out of
78 who declared finance as their main profession is virtually indistinguishable from that of
the others (73.6% for finance professionals vs. 72.2% for the others). In our experiment,
financial experience seems to have no correlation with performance. Skeptics may wish to
try the challenge for themselves, and demonstrate that in short order, they can become quite
skilled at differentiating real financial data from randomized series.
Instead, we conjecture that feedback—which allows subjects to learn and adapt—is the
most significant factor in allowing typical subjects to distinguish real market returns from
their randomized counterpart. Casual inspection of Figures 1–4 shows that distinguishing
real data from randomized data is challenging; for some data sets the real chart tends to be
smoother, as in Figure 2, while for other data sets the opposite is true, the real chart tends
to be spikier, as in Figure 4. But for each data set, feedback from just a few trials seems
sufficient for the user to extract characteristics of the data to be used in classifying future
charts. Our conjecture is supported by the information about winning strategies that some
of the subjects volunteered to share with us (anonymously). For example, a subject wrote:
Admittedly, when first viewing the two data sets in the practice mode, it is
impossible to tell which one is real, and which one is random, however, there is a
pattern that quickly emerges and then the game becomes simple and the human
eye can easily pick out the real array (often in under 1 second of time). In the
Bull and Bear games, the real data array was smoother and less volatile, while
for the Elk and Reindeer games it was the opposite: the real array was more
noisy.
The human eye—as opposed to a computer algorithm—may have a crucial advantage. It
is well known that computers still struggle with many image-recognition and classification
tasks that are trivial for humans, and the same may be said for distinguishing market returns
from randomized versions. This gap between human and algorithmic pattern recognition may
explain the gulf separating technical analysis (a largely human endeavor) and quantitative
financial analysis (a more analytical and algorithmic approach), and why the former practice
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persists despite the lack of support from the latter.
More generally, human intelligence is intertwined with pattern recognition and predic-
tion (Hawkins, 2004), and financial pattern recognition is just one of many domains in
which we excel. Our simple experimental framework suggests the possibility of developing
human/computer interfaces that allow us to translate certain human abilities into other
domains and functional specifications. For example, with the proper interface, it may be
possible to translate the hand-eye coordination of highly skilled video-gamers to completely
unrelated pattern-recognition and prediction problems such as weather forecasting or finan-
cial trading. We hope to explore such interfaces in future research.
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